Judicial Tests to Determine Predatory Pricing Before and After \u3cem\u3eMatsushita\u3c/em\u3e by Simkovic, Martin S.
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 44 Number 3 Article 5 
1-1-1990 
Judicial Tests to Determine Predatory Pricing Before and After 
Matsushita 
Martin S. Simkovic 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
Recommended Citation 
Martin S. Simkovic, Judicial Tests to Determine Predatory Pricing Before and After Matsushita, 44 U. 
Miami L. Rev. 839 (1990) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol44/iss3/5 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
library@law.miami.edu. 
CASE COMMENT
Judicial Tests to Determine Predatory Pricing
Before and After Matsushita
I. INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 839
II. THE AREEDA-TURNER TEST ........................................... 842
III. CASES IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING MATSUSHITA ........................... 844
A. Circuits Utilizing the Areeda-Turner Test and Other Cost-Determinative
Tests ............................................................ 844
B. Circuits Utilizing Measures of Cost to Allocate the Burden of Proof ........ 849
C. Circuits Utilizing a Totality of the Circumstances Approach .............. 853
IV. THE MATSuSHITA DECISION ............................................... 855
A . F acts ............................................................ 855
B . H olding .......................................................... 857
C . A nalysis .......................................................... 861
V. CASES FOLLOWING MA 7TUSHITA ........................................... 862
A. The Cost-Determinative Approach .................................... 863
B. Circuits Utilizing the Cost-Price Relationship to Allocate the Burden of
P roof ............................................................ 867
C. Circuits Utilizing a Totality of the Circumstances Approach .............. 871
VI. CONCLUSION ......................................................... 874
I. INTRODUCTION
In a predatory pricing action, a firm claims that it has suffered an
antitrust injury because the defendant has priced its goods so low that
the plaintiff firm is forced out of the market. Antitrust law does not,
however, require firms to price their goods so as to allow their com-
petitors a share of the market. On the contrary, the very competition
that antitrust law is designed to protect demands that firms try to
underbid each other in order to ultimately benefit the consumer.I
Distinguishing illegal predatory pricing from aggressive competitive
pricing is a definitional task that the courts have not yet adequately
resolved.
In 1975, Phillip Areeda and Donald F. Turner published an arti-
cle in which they defined predatory pricing in such a way as to allow
efficient firms to give consumers the advantage of efficiency through
low prices, yet prevent firms from using their mere size or financial
1. "The antitrust laws, however, were enacted for 'the protection of competition, not
competitors.'" Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977)
(quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).
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resources to drive out competitors.' Prior to 1975, predatory pricing
claims were very rare,3 but following the publication of the Areeda-
Turner test, the incidence of predatory pricing claims rose
dramatically.
Moreover, following the publication of the Areeda-Turner arti-
cle, many jurisdictions adopted a cost-based analysis of predatory
pricing claims.' This type of analysis relies exlusively on a defend-
ant's cost and pricing without regard to other factors (such as a
defendant's intent or barriers to market entry). The United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit adopted this cost-based analysis
with little variation.6 Other courts adopted a modification of the cost-
based analysis,7 and still other jurisdictions began using a cost-based
analysis to allocate the burdens of proof and production." These cost-
determinative approaches establish overwhelming obstacles to suits
alleging predatory behavior. The Areeda-Turner test, for example,
requires a plaintiff to prove that the alleged predator charged prices
below its average variable cost.9 As applied by the Sixth and Eleventh
Circuits, the modified test requires a plaintiff to show that the defend-
ant's prices were below its average cost. 10 Even the Ninth Circuit,
which does not require a plaintiff to prove that the defendant's prices
were below average total cost, requires a plaintiff to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the defendant engaged in anticompeti-
2. Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the
,Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 698 (1975).
3. See Liebeler, Whither Predatory Pricing? From Areeda & Turner to Matsushita, 61
N.D.L. REV. 1052 (1986) (Prior to 1975, there appeared to have been only one significant
predatory pricing case.).
4. See Liebeler, supra note 3, at app. A (collecting 55 federal predatory pricing decisions
between January 1, 1975 and April 30, 1986). The increased incidence of predatory pricing is
ironic because Areeda and Turner apparently intended to discourage predatory pricing claims
by creating a stricter definition of predatory pricing than had been previously applied. Id. at
1053; see also infra notes 18-28 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478 (1st Cir. 1988);
Northeastern Tel. Co. v. AT&T, 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982);
International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976).
6. See Barry Wright v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983).
7. See Northeastern, 651 F.2d at 76; International Air, 517 F.2d at 714.
8. See McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487 (1 1th Cir. 1988); Arthur
S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 729 F.2d 1050 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036
(1984); Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM, 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
955 (1983).
9. See Barry Wright, 724 F.2d at 236.
10. See McGahee, 858 F.2d at 1496; Langenderfer, 729 F.2d at 1058. Under this test, it is
easier to establish predatory pricing because average cost is always greater than average
variable cost. Transamerica, 698 F.2d at 1384-85.
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tive conduct if the defendant's prices were above average total cost. "
The Seventh and Tenth Circuits, however, purportedly do not
make the cost-price analysis determinative. These courts neither
judge the legality of a challenged price by analyzing it against some
measure of cost, nor do they allocate the burdens of proof or produc-
tion based upon such analysis. Rather, these courts examine preda-
tory pricing claims by focusing on all of the circumstances
surrounding a defendant's pricing practices.' 2 Among the factors that
courts consider are price, the defendant's subjective intent, barriers to
market entry, and the ability of the defendant to restrict output and
reap monopoly profits.I3 Even in these circuits, however, the test-as
applied-seems to emphasize cost as the determinative factor.
The various approaches adopted by the United States Courts of
Appeals have one thing in common: they all utilize one element or
another of the Areeda-Turner cost-based approach. This test, even in
its most flexible application,' 4 places an inordinate burden on a plain-
tiff and lacks the flexibility needed to analyze properly alleged viola-
tions. Courts summarily dismiss or defeat antitrust claims due to
plaintiffs' failure to show that defendants' prices were below some
suggested measure of cost.'5 In those jurisdictions that use measures
of cost to allocate the burden of proof or production, the evidentiary
burden resulting from a finding that prices are higher than either
average total cost or average variable cost is so great that a plaintiff's
chances of success are only slightly higher than in those jurisdictions
utilizing the cost-based analysis. Even in those jurisdictions that pur-
port to examine the "totality of the circumstances," the emphasis on
cost is in most cases determinative. Furthermore, all of the circuits
uniformly fail to give appropriate weight to factors which are essen-
tially as important as the cost-price analysis; these factors include the
existence of barriers to market entry, the number of competitors in
11. See Transamerica, 698 F.2d at 1388.
12. See Chillicothe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 615 F.2d 427 (7th Cir.
1980); Pacific Eng'g & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 879 (1977).
13. See Pacific, 551 F.2d at 797 (citing Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A
Comment, 89 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1976)).
14. The most flexible approach is that of the Tenth and Seventh Circuits, which purports
to examine the totality of the circumstances in analyzing a predatory pricing claim. See
Chillicothe, 615 F.2d at 432; Pacific, 551 F.2d at 797.
15. See, e.g., Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 729 F.2d 1050 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227
(1st Cir. 1983); Northeastern Tel. Co. v. AT&T, 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 943 (1982); Chillicothe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 615 F.2d 427 (7th
Cir. 1980).
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the market, and the market strength and subjective intent of the
alleged predator.
This Comment provides both a historical and critical analysis of
the present methods that the courts use to determine the existence of
predatory pricing. Section II of this Comment focuses on the Areeda-
Turner test, which many courts have adopted in one form or another
as the method by which to resolve predatory pricing claims. Section
III focuses on those cases decided after the creation of the Areeda-
Turner test but prior to the United States Supreme Court decision in
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,16 a case
some thought signalled an end to successful antitrust. actions predi-
cated upon allegations of predatory pricing. Section IV focuses on the
Supreme Court decision in Matsushita, as well as its expected effect on
subsequent predatory pricing claims. Section V focuses on those
predatory pricing claims decided after Matsushita and analyzes
whether Matsushita has had the expected effect, or any effect, on the
tests used to determine predatory pricing or on the courts' attitudes
towards predatory pricing claims.
II. THE AREEDA-TURNER TEST
An analysis of predatory pricing cases, as well as the tests used to
determine the existence of predatory pricing, must begin with an anal-
ysis of the predatory pricing test that professors Phillip Areeda and
Donald F. Turner established in 1975.17 The article that introduced
this test questioned the viability of a predatory pricing scheme, and
the motivation of a firm to attempt such a scheme.18  The authors
believed that the fears that large firms would be inclined to engage in
predatory pricing were exaggerated. 19 "The prospects of an adequate
future payoff," they stated, "will seldom be sufficient to motivate pre-
dation."20 Areeda and Turner further concluded that, because of this,
proven cases of predatory pricing had been extremely rare.21 It would
be expected that the federal courts adopting the Areeda-Turner test
would similarly adopt its inherent skepticism.
The Areeda-Turner test established guidelines to determine the
legality of a firm's pricing practices. The authors stated that prices
16. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
17. Areeda & Turner, supra note 2.
18. See id. at 698-99.
19. Id. at 698.
20. Id. at 699.
21. This conclusion was based upon a 1971 study. Koller, The Myth of Predatory
Pricing-An Empirical Study, 4 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 105 (1971); see also Areeda &
Turner, supra note 2, at 699 n.7.
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above average total cost22 should be deemed nonpredatory.23 They
argued that this rule should apply even when: () a firm charges less
than the profit-maximizing price in order to destroy rivals; or (2) a
firm initially charges the profit-maximizing price, but then lowers its
prices when rivals appear in the market, and subsequently raises its
prices when the rivals are destroyed.24 As to prices below the profit-
maximizing price, the authors stated that "[s]uperior products or ser-
vice, successful innovation, or other effective competition on the mer-
its always tends to exclude rivals."' 25 As long as the prices are at or
above average total cost, Areeda and Turner believed that the social
benefits of lower prices, higher output, and fuller use of a firm's pro-
ductive capacity outweighed the speculative limitation on market par-
ticipation. 26  The authors also found short-term price reductions
permissible under the Sherman Act.2 7 They concluded that tempo-
rary price reductions are even less exclusionary than permanently low
prices because market entrants may have the staying power to meet a
monopolist's temporarily low price.28
The authors did, however, recognize some problems inherent in
applying a rule that permits prices to be set at or above average cost.
Although average cost includes a "normal" return on investment, this
return is not easily ascertainable. 29 The authors nonetheless con-
cluded that the benefit of such a rule is that it disposes of those cases
in which an alleged predator's rate of return is normal by any reason-
able test.30
The Areeda-Turner guidelines also provided that prices above
average variable cost,3 I a surrogate for marginal cost,3 2 should be
deemed to be nonpredatory, whereas prices below average variable
cost should be deemed to be predatory. 33 Defenses are available, how-
22. Average total cost per item produced is defined as the sum of fixed costs and total
variable costs divided by total output. Areeda & Turner, supra note 2, at 700.
23. Id. at 705.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 705-06.
27. Id.
28. Id. Professors Areeda and Turner also discussed the administrative problems involved
in adequately monitoring and controlling temporary price reductions. Id. at 707.
29. Id. at 709.
30. Id.
31. Average variable cost is defined as the sum of all variable costs divided by the total
output. Id. at 700.
32. Marginal cost is the increment to total cost resulting from the production of an
additional unit of output. Id.
33. Id. at 733.
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ever, to a firm with no substantial market share.34 Such a firm may
counter a predatory pricing allegation by showing that it lowered
prices to meet the prices of a competitor or to conduct a special pro-
motion.35 Areeda and Turner commented that a business with sub-
stantial market power would have no motivation to meet competitors'
prices or to conduct promotional ventures; therefore, the authors
determined that these defenses should not be available to such a
firm.
36
III. CASES IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING MATSUSHITA
The United States Courts of Appeals have used various tests in
the past to determine whether a firm has engaged in predatory pric-
ing. The First, Second, and Fifth Circuits have utilized various forms
of the the Areeda-Turner cost-determinative test. The Sixth, Ninth,
and Eleventh Circuits have used a slightly more flexible approach in
which they considered, in addition to economic factors, other circum-
stantial evidence of price predation. In these circuits, the courts have
utilized the relationship between cost and price to allocate the bur-
dens of proof and production. The Seventh and Tenth Circuits, on
the other hand, purported to examine predatory pricing claims by
focusing on all of the circumstances surrounding a defendant's pricing
practices. This Section will examine the differences among these three
approaches, as well as the internal differences within each of the three
modalities.
A. Circuits Utilizing the Areeda-Turner Test and Other Cost-
Determinative Tests
The First, Second, and Fifth Circuits utilized the Areeda-Turner
test with only slight variation. In these circuits, the relationship
between a defendant's cost and price was determinative: These cir-
cuits refused to consider other circumstantial evidence of price
predation.
In Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp. ,7 the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit formally adopted a test closely
resembling the Areeda-Turner cost-based test.3" In Barry Wright, the
34. Id. at 713-16.
35. Id. at 715-16.
36. Id.
37. 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983).
38. Id. at 232-33. The First Circuit used the terms "avoidable" or "incremental" costs
and defined them as "the costs that the firm would save by not producing the additional
product it can sell at that price." Id. at 232. These terms are essentially the same as the
"marginal" costs referred to in the Areeda-Turner article, costs for which average variable cost
[Vol. 44:839
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plaintiff, a manufacturer of snubbers (a shock absorber used in build-
ing pipe systems for nuclear power plants), alleged that Pacific, a co-
defendant, had predatorily priced its snubbers in granting ITT Grin-
nell 25% and 30% discounts.3 9 The United States District Court for
the District of Massachussetts found that the prices charged, although
lower than normal, generated revenues that were more than sufficient
to cover the total cost of producing the goods.' As such, the court
entered judgment for the defendant.
41
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that price cutting by a firm with
a substantial market share4 2 might still prove to be unlawful even if
prices remained above average total cost.43 The plaintiff also sug-
gested that the court look to the subjective intent of the defendant to
determine whether it had engaged in predatory pricing." The court
of appeals rejected both of these arguments; because the defendant's
prices exceeded both the incremental (marginal) cost and the average
total cost, the First Circuit affirmed the decision of the trial court.45
The First Circuit's decision in Barry Wright exemplifies the defi-
ciencies inherent in an analysis of predatory pricing claims based
solely on the relationship between price and cost. The defendant's
pricing policies should have been subject to the strictest scrutiny; at
the time of the alleged violations, it controlled from 83% to 94% of
the relevant market.4 6 Additionally, no firm other than the plaintiff
had competed with the defendant in the snubber market.47 The
defendant had every motivation to price its snubbers in such a way as
is a surrogate under the Areeda-Turner test. The First Circuit, however, reserved deciding
whether average variable cost is an appropriate surrogate for "avoidable" or "incremental"
costs. Id. at 233.
39. Id. at 229-30. At the time of the appeal, Pacific was the sole defendant. ITT Grinnell
Corporation, the buyer of the snubbers, had settled with the plaintiff. Id. at 230.
40. Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnel Corp., 555 F. Supp. 1264, 1269 (D. Mass.), aff'd
724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983).
41. Barry Wright, 724 F.2d at 228.
42. Pacific sold 47% of all snubbers in 1976; its market share increased to 94% by 1979.
Id. at 229.
43. The plaintiff argued for the standard used by the Ninth Circuit, whereby a plaintiff can
prevail even if prices exceed average total cost if the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant's pricing policy was predatory. Id. at 233. The court
acknowledged that, although the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have accepted this standard, the
First Circuit did not. Id. at 234. For a discussion of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits' approaches,
see infra notes 64-73 & 83-92 and accompanying text.
44. Barry Wright, 724 F.2d at 232. The court refused to consider the defendant's
subjective intent and instead opted for a cost-based analysis. The court stated that the
suggested standard was too vague and that evidence of such an intent would most likely be
nonexistent. Id.
45. Id. at 232-36.
46. Id. at 229.
47. Id.
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to destroy its only market rival. Still, the First Circuit did not con-
sider evidence of subjective intent nor did it consider other evidence of
possible predation, namely that the prices charged were lower than
normal. In refusing to do so, the court may have circumvented
the very purpose behind the Sherman Act-the promotion of
competition.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also
adopted a variation of the Areeda Turner cost-based test in Northeast-
ern Telephone Co. v. AT&T4 The Second Circuit's approach, how-
ever, went further in protecting market leaders from predatory
pricing claims by allowing a firm with substantial market power to
justify below-cost pricing practices. In dicta, the Second Circuit
stated that a defendant is entitled to justify pricing below marginal
cost by proving that an acceptable business justification for its pricing
practices existed.49 In light of the fact that AT&T was firmly
entrenched in the market and possessed substantial market power,
this position contravenes that of Professors Areeda and Turner.
Areeda and Turner would not allow such a defendant the opportunity
to justify its prices and, in such circumstances, would find the price to
be unlawful per se.5" Presumably, because the First Circuit adopted
the Areeda-Turner test in its unaltered form, it would do likewise.
In Northeastern, a supplier of telephone terminal equipment
brought an action against AT&T under both Section 1 and Section 2
of the Sherman Act, alleging, among other claims,51 that AT&T had
predatorily priced its public branch exchanges and key telephones.5 2
Northeastern, a small supplier, was challenging an entity that had
enjoyed a federally approved monopoly for many years.53 As the
court of appeals stated, "[m]etaphorically, Northeastern was a mos-
quito challenging an elephant.' '5 4 A jury rendered a verdict for the
plaintiff and awarded damages in excess of five million dollars,55
which the trial court trebled pursuant to Section 4 of the Clayton
48. 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982).
49. See id. at 91 n.24.
50. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
51. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant had conspired with others to monopolize
the market in Conneticut in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988),
and had engaged in other anticompetitive conduct in its advertising, marketing, introduction
of new products, and other technological tactics designed to impede competition.
Northeastern, 651 F.2d at 80-81.
52. Northeastern, 651 F.2d at 80.
53. Id. at 79-80.
54. Id. at 80.




Surprisingly, the Second Circuit reversed the trial court without
considering any of the relevant aforementioned factors. In a case that
warranted the strictest scrutiny given the vastly greater market share
and regulatory advantages of the defendant, the court explicitly
adopted the Areeda-Turner test57 and its inherent skepticism of the
viability of predatory pricing schemes.5" The court stated: "There is
considerable evidence, derived from historical sources and from eco-
nomic teaching, that predation is rare."59 Accordingly, the court of
appeals found that there was no evidence which supported the plain-
tiff's predatory pricing claim.' The court stated that, because the
defendant's prices were above the average variable cost of the equip-
ment, the pricing of the equipment was not predatory.61 The court
seemed to ignore the relative discrepancy in the market strength of
the two rivals, and it refused to accept a measure of cost different
from that proposed by Areeda and Turner.62 This inflexibility may
have resulted in diminished competition in the affected market.63
56. Id. (applying 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988)).
57. Id. at 88. The court stated that this test should apply in the general case, at least, but
it did not delineate what would constitute an exception. Id.
58. For a discussion of the skepticism inherent in the Areeda-Turner test, see supra notes
18-21 and accompanying text.
59. Northeastern, 651 F.2d at 88 (citing McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J.L. &
EcON. 289, 290-300 (1980)). However, the court implicitly stated that predatory pricing is
more likely to occur where market barriers make market entry difficult or where the defendant
firm is a multi-product firm. Id. at 88-89.
60. Id. at 91. The plaintiff urged the court to use fully distributed cost as the measure
below which predatory pricing would be presumed. Id. Fully distributed cost is "the marginal
or incremental cost of supplying a particular good or service [plus] some portion of the
unattributable costs (i.e., indirect costs.)." Id. at 89 n.20.
61. Id. at 92.
62. Id. at 89-91.
63. In Broadway Delivery Corp. v. United Parcel Service of America, Inc., 651 F.2d 122
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 968 (1981), a case decided just seven days after Northeastern,
the Second Circuit again analyzed the sufficiency of evidence required to sustain a predatory
pricing claim. The plaintiffs, various firms which transported goods in New York City, did not
demonstrate price predation to the court's satisfaction because they had not introduced
evidence that would have permitted a jury to assess carefully the relationship between the
prices charged for delivery services and the costs of such delivery. ld. at 131. The plaintiffs'
evidence combined all of the defendant's traffic in one category, all of its revenues in another,
and all of its profits in a third. Id. The court stated that an expert in cost accounting may
have been able to discern the relevant information for purposes of a predatory pricing analysis,
but no expert testimony was presented. Id. Additionally, the defendant had introduced
uncontradicted evidence that it had earned substantial profits in the contested years. Id.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaints. Id. at
132. The court stated that, at most, the plaintiffs' evidence established that the defendant's
prices were lower than the prices charged by some of the plaintiffs. Id. at 131.
Although the Broadway court's cost-based analysis of the predatory pricing claim can be
criticized, its conclusion cannot. The analysis of all relevant factors indicates the
1990]
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has also
utilized a cost-determinative approach, with one important variation.
In International Air Industries, Inc. v. American Excelsior Co.," the
court of appeals stated that, as a general rule, a plaintiff must prove
that a defendant is charging prices below its average variable cost.65
If the barriers to market entry are high, however, the plaintiff can
prevail by showing that the defendant charged prices below its short-
run profit-maximizing price.6 6 This approach differs from the
approaches utilized by both the First and Second Circuits, which
exclusively adhered to the Areeda-Turner average variable cost guide-
lines irrespective of barriers to market entry.
In a subsequent case, Adjusters Replace-A-Car v. Agency Rent-A-
Car,6 7 the Fifth Circuit reiterated its commitment to a cost-based eco-
nomic analysis of predatory pricing claims. In that case, however, the
court of appeals expressly stated that the subjective intent of the
defendant was also an important factor in analyzing a predatory pric-
ing claim.68 Citing International Air, the court stated: "We were
unwilling, in an attempted monopolization case, to relegate the intent
element to the status of an automatic and irrebuttable inference. ' '69
Accordingly, the court stated that it did not accept the per se
approach suggested by Professors Areeda and Turner.7"
The Fifth Circuit, like the Sixth, 71 expressly stressed the impor-
tance of the intent factor. In analyzing the predatory pricing claim,
however, the Adjusters court concentrated not on intent, but on price
implausibility of a predatory pricing scheme in this case. For example, the defendant's rates
were subject to the approval of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Id. at 131.
Additionally, the defendant could not have substantially raised its prices without losing
customers to its chief competitor, the United States Postal Service. Id. The court also found
that the plaintiffs had failed to present evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find
that the defendant possessed monopoly market power, a requisite element of a claim arising
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 126-31. These factors warranted the dismissal of
the complaint.
64. 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976).
65. Id. at 724.
66. Id.
67. 735 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985).
68. Id. at 890.
69. Id. (citing International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714 (5th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976)). In a prior decision, Malcolm v. Marathon Oil
Co., 642 F.2d 845 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1125 (1981), the Fifth Circuit
acknowledged the importance of the intent element. In that case, the court stated that
predatory pricing differs from healthy pricing in its motive and intent. Id. at 853-54. Still, the
court refused to depart from prior precedent and instead adhered to the cost-based analysis.
Adjusters, 735 F.2d at 890.
70. Adjusters, 735 F.2d at 890.




as it related to cost. Although the court stated that it did not adopt
the per se approach suggested by Areeda and Turner, the cost-based
analysis seemed to have been determinative. The court stated that the
plaintiff had not established that the defendant's prices were below its
average variable cost; the plaintiff therefore lacked an actionable pred-
atory pricing claim.72 This application suggests that the Fifth Cir-
cuit's position was that prices above average variable cost were
conclusively lawful, unless the plaintiff could prove that there were
high barriers to market entry. Moreover, the court's actions seemed
to contradict the statements it made rejecting the Areeda-Turner per
se approach.
In both cases, the Fifth Circuit accepted the Areeda-Turner defi-
nition of predatory pricing as the "deliberate sacrifice of present reve-
nues for the purpose of driving rivals out of the market and then
recouping the losses through higher profits earned in the absence of
competition. ' 73 Like others employing a cost-determinative test for
predatory pricing, the Fifth Circuit refused to acknowledge that a
firm can practice predatory pricing under this definition even if its
goods are priced above its average variable costs. Although these
courts concentrate on the relationship between cost and price, they
are missing what they themselves have defined as the real issue:
Whether the benefit of defendant's pricing structure hinges upon forc-
ing competitors out of the market.
B. Circuits Utilizing Measures of Cost to Allocate
the Burden of Proof
The Sixth and Ninth Circuits74 have utilized a test for predatory
pricing in which the relationship between cost and price is used to
allocate the burden of proof.75 The Ninth Circuit approach, however,
differed from that of the Sixth Circuit in one major respect: In the
Sixth Circuit, prices above average total cost were conclusively
72. Adjusters, 735 F.2d at 891. In Adjusters, the plaintiff relied upon the defendant's
admission that, in the challenged markets, the defendant's rental offices operated at a net loss
during the time of the alleged predatory pricing. Id.
73. Id. at 889 (citing International Air, 517 F.2d at 723).
74. After Matsushita, the Eleventh Circuit also adopted a test in which the relationship
between cost and price was used to allocate the burden of proof. See McGahee v. Northern
Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1988).
75. See Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 729 F.2d 1050 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984); D.E. Rogers Assocs., Inc. v. Gardener-Denver Co., 718 F.2d
1431 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1242 (1984); Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM, 698
F.2d 1377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 955 (1983); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v.
ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
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deemed to be lawful,76 whereas a plaintiff in the Ninth Circuit could
prove such prices unlawful by showing clear and convincing evidence
of predatory intent.77 In both circuits, however, if a defendant's
prices were below average total cost but above average variable cost,
the plaintiff bore the burden of proving predatory pricing. 7 If, how-
ever, the plaintiff proved that the defendant's price was below the
average variable cost, the plaintiff had then met his burden of produc-
tion, and the burden then shifted to the defendant to justify its
prices.79 Other factors such as subjective intent, market barriers, pos-
sible motive, and circumstantial evidence are accepted as proof of pre-
dation."0 This burden-shifting approach would seem to be beneficial
to a plaintiff who does not have the relevant price and cost figures of
his rival, or who is in a situation where such figures indicate a price
greater than some measure of cost.
The weakness in this approach, however, is that too much
emphasis is placed upon the cost-price analysis and too little on the
other factors. If a defendant's prices were above average total cost,
the plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant's pricing practices were anticompetitive. Such a burden
realistically makes the cost-price analysis determinative.8  Addition-
ally, the presumption raised when a defendant's price is above its
average variable cost has been difficult to overcome.8 2 Still, this
approach allows for more flexibility in analyzing alleged price viola-
tions than did the strict cost-based approaches of the First, Second,
and Fifth Circuits.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for-
mally adopted this approach in two steps. In William Inglis & Sons
Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co. ,83 the Ninth Circuit enun-
ciated the standard as it pertained to prices which were above average
variable cost but below average total cost.84 The court stated that,
76. See Langenderfer, 729 F.2d at 1058.
77. See Transamerica, 698 F.2d at 1377.
78. See Rogers, 718 F.2d at 1431; Transamerica, 698 F.2d at 1377.
79. See Rogers, 718 F.2d at 1431; Transamerica, 698 F.2d at 1377.
80. See Marsann Co. v. Brammall, Inc., 788 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1986).
81. See Transamerica, 698 F.2d at 1386-89.
82. Id.
83. 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
84. Id. at 1034-36. Although the Ninth Circuit did not expressly limit the application of
its test to this classification of prices, a subsequent decision in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California construed the Inglis holding as doing such. In re IBM
Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979). On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit clarified its position and stated that its test, whereby the cost-price analysis is
utilized to allocate the burden of proof, also applied to those prices above average total cost.
Transamerica, 698 F.2d at 1386-89.
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although average variable cost is generally a reliable indicator, there
are market situations where a rational firm would find it wise to sell
below such cost. 5 Alternatively, the court acknowledged that a firm
selling above average variable cost could, in some circumstances, be
guilty of predation.8 6 The court stated: "[T]o establish predatory
pricing a plaintiff must prove that the anticipated benefits of [a]
defendant's price depended on its tendency to discipline or eliminate
competition and thereby enhance the firm's long term ability to reap
the benefits of monopoly power." 7 Accordingly, the price of an item
was not determinative, but it was relevant in allocating the burdens of
proof and production.88
In Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM, 9 the Ninth Circuit took
the final step and clearly established that the cost-price analysis was
not determinative even in instances in which a defendant's prices were
above the average total cost of its goods.9 0 The Ninth Circuit clarified
its holding in Inglis, stating that "the uncertainty and imprecision in
determining 'costs' counsel against basing conclusive presumptions on
the relation between prices and costs."'" The court further stated that
the cost-determinative tests foreclosed the consideration of other sig-
nificant factors-intent, market power, market structure, and long-
term behavior. 92
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit later
purported to adopt the Ninth Circuit's approach to the resolution of
predatory pricing claims in D.E. Rogers Associates, Inc. v. Gardner-
Denver Co.93 In Rogers, a small manufacturer of ratchet wrenches
brought an antitrust action against the largest manufacturer of ratchet
wrenches in the United States.94 In considering the plaintiff's preda-
tory pricing claim, the Sixth Circuit considered the relative merits of
an objective cost-based analysis.95 The court concluded that the
Ninth Circuit's approach, which allowed for the additional considera-
85. Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1035.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1035-36. Thus, under the Ninth Circuit's approach, if a defendant's prices are
below average total cost but above average variable cost, the plaintiff bears the burden of
proving predatory pricing. If, however, the plaintiff proves that the defendant's prices were
below average variable cost, the plaintiff has met its burden of production, and the burden
shifts to the defendant to justify its prices. Id.
89. 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 955 (1983).
90. Id. at 1386-88.
91. Id. at 1387.
92. Id.
93. 718 F.2d 1431 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1242 (1984).
94. Id. at 1433.
95. Id. at 1436.
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tion of other factors indicative of predation, had more merit. 96 In
applying this more flexible approach to the facts of the case, however,
the court still found that the plaintiff had not presented any viable
evidence-either direct or indirect--of predatory pricing.97
In Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co.,98 a case
decided approximately five months later, the Sixth Circuit retreated
somewhat from the position taken by the Ninth Circuit in Transamer-
ica, which was decided after the Sixth Circuit had decided Rogers.
The Sixth Circuit differed with the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Trans-
america and held that prices above average total cost are presump-
tively lawful. 99 If a defendant's prices are below its average total cost,
however, the Ninth Circuit test would be used to allocate the burden
of proof through the use of the cost-price analysis.10° In effect, the
Sixth Circuit utilizes a test which is a hybrid of the two approaches.
Cost is determinative if a plaintiff cannot show that a defendant's
prices are below average total cost. Yet, if the plaintiff can meet this
requirement, the court is willing to consider other factors in analyzing
a predatory pricing claim. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit standard
elaborated in Rogers was still viable in analyzing those predatory pric-
ing claims in which a defendant's prices were below average total cost.
The apparent conflict between these two cases, decided only
months apart, was due to the Sixth Circuit's misinterpretation of the
Ninth Circuit's approach. In Rogers, where the defendant's prices
were below average total cost, the Sixth Circuit interpreted the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Inglis as limiting the use of circumstantial evi-
dence of predation to those cases where a defendant's prices are below
its average total cost. Although the Ninth Circuit did not explicitly
limit its holding in Inglis in this way, a district court within that cir-
cuit interpreted the Inglis decision in much the same way."1' Subse-
quently, the Ninth Circuit clarified its position and held that
predation could still be proved-albeit under a higher burden of
proof-where a defendant's prices are above average total cost.'0 2 In
such a case, however, the plaintiff has the burden of proving preda-
tory intent by clear and convincing evidence. In Langenderfer, the
96. Id. at 1437.
97. Id.
98. 729 F.2d 1050 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984).
99. Id. at 1056-58.
100. Id.
101. See In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal.
1979), aff'd sub nom., Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM, 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 955 (1983).
102. See Langenderfer, 729 F.2d at 1056-58.
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Sixth Circuit refused to accept what it deemed to be an extension of
the Inglis standard.
In Langenderfer, the Sixth Circuit also purported to adopt the
Fifth Circuit's position that "motive or intent is the distinguishing
characteristic of predatory pricing."' °3 The court stated that "preda-
tory pricing differs from healthy competitive pricing in its motive: 'a
predator by his pricing practices seeks to impose losses on other firms
not garner gains for itself.'"" ' ° Accordingly, the plaintiff in
Langenderfer argued that predatory pricing could be found solely on
the basis of a seller's intent.1
0 5
The Langenderfer court rejected this argument. Instead of con-
sidering the subjective intent of the defendant-a factor the Sixth Cir-
cuit stated was the distinguishing characteristic of predatory
pricing-the court relied only upon a cost-price analysis and vacated
the lower court judgment entered for the plaintiff upon a jury ver-
dict."0 6 This decision ignored compelling evidence that the defend-
ant's activities were motivated by the desire to eliminate the
competition and dominate the market. 07 Additionally, evidence was
introduced that the defendant had sacrificed profits in construction
bids in order to eliminate the competition.108 The court also refused
to consider evidence of the defendant's market power; Johnson did
roughly 76% of the turnpike paving in the relevant market and had
successfully bid on well over 50% of the government contracts avail-
able in the Ohio market. 109 In refusing to consider these factors, the
Sixth Circuit summarily dismissed the predatory pricing claim with-
out adequately considering anything other than the relationship
between the defendant's costs and its prices. A more flexible
approach would have been better suited to analyze the merits of the
plaintiff's claim, but the court implicitly sanctioned anticompetitive
pricing as long as a predator's price exceeds its average total cost.
C. Circuits Utilizing a Totality of the Circumstances Approach
Prior to Matsushita, the Seventh and Tenth Circuits purported to
utilize a test in which the legality of a firm's pricing practices was
determined by considering the totality of the circumstances surround-
103. Id. at 1057.
104. Id. (citing Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Concrete Corp., 691 F.2d 818 (6th Cir.
1982)).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1058.
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ing such practices. The Tenth Circuit acknowledged the controversial
nature of the cost-determinative approach in Pacific Engineering &
Production Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp. " Among the factors that the
court expressed a willingness to consider were a firm's subjective
intent, barriers to market entry, and other long-run variables that
help determine whether a monopolist will be able to restrict output
and reap monopoly benefits.11' In Pacific, the court found that the
defendant's prices were always above average variable cost and margi-
nal cost."I2 Additionally, the court stated that it did not intend to
adopt a solely cost-based test, but there were nonetheless no other
relevant factors indicating anticompetitive conduct on the part of the
defendant." 3  Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the judg-
ment for the plaintiff." 4
In Chillicothe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 5 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit also adopted
this approach. In Chillicothe, the court stated that "while [it
accepted] the use of marginal or average variable cost as both a rele-
vant and extremely useful factor in determining the presence of preda-
tory conduct, [it was] willing to consider the presence of other factors
in [its] evaluation." ' 1 6 Still, the analysis of the plaintiff's predatory
pricing claim concentrated only on the relationship between the
defendant's prices and its costs," 7 and the defendant's prices were
above average variable cost and above average total cost." 8 Conse-
quently, the court found the defendant's pricing practices lawful.'9
Although both the Seventh and Tenth Circuits purported to con-
sider all of the relevant circumstances surrounding a defendant's pric-
ing practices, their analysis does not substantiate their positions. In
both cases, the court neither focused on nor emphasized factors other
than the relationship between the defendant's prices and its costs.
120
110. 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977). In Pacific, a manufacturer
of an oxidizer used in solid rocket fuel brought an action against a competitor, alleging that the
competitor had engaged in predatory pricing. Id. at 791. The trial court entered a judgment
for the plaintiff and awarded treble damages totalling over five million dollars. Id.
111. Id. at 797. These are the same variables enunciated in Scherer, supra note 13.
112. Pacific, 551 F.2d at 797.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. 615 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1980).
116. Id. at 432. Although the court did not delineate the other factors it would be willing
to consider, the court cited to Pacific, 551 F.2d at 797. For a discussion of the other factors,
see supra note 13 and accompanying text.
117. See Chillicothe, 615 F.2d at 432.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Subsequent to Matsushita, these two courts seem to have taken quite different
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Realistically, these approaches did not differ from the cost-determina-
tive approaches utilized by the First, Second, and Fifth Circuits. As a
result of the Seventh Circuit's analysis and irrespective of its dicta to
the contrary, the Seventh Circuit's approach to the resolution of pred-
atory pricing claims is essentially the same as the cost-determinative
approach.
IV. THE MATSUSHITA DECISION
A. Facts 121
In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,'
22
the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of predatory
pricing for the first time since 1967.123 The Court agreed with those
commentators who had concluded that predatory pricing schemes are
rarely tried and, if tried, are rarely successful.' 24 Consequently, some
commentators believed that Matsushita heralded an end to successful
antitrust actions predicated upon allegations of predatory pricing. 125
In Matsushita, two American manufacturers and sellers of televi-
sion sets, Zenith Radio Corporation and National Union Electric
Corporation, brought suit 26 against twenty-one corporations that
manufacture and sell consumer electronic products; the plaintiffs
alleged violations of federal antitrust laws.I' The defendants
included both Japanese manufacturers of electronic products and
American firms, controlled by Japanese parents, that sell these Japa-
nese-manufactured products.12 The plaintiffs alleged that the defend-
ants had conspired to drive them out of the electronic product market
approaches toward the resolution of predatory pricing claims; the Tenth Circuit seems to be
more committed to the totality of the circumstances approach, whereas, the Seventh Circuit
seems to utilize more of a cost-determinative analysis. For a further discussion of these
approaches following Matsushita, see infra notes 246-65 and accompanying text.
121. As the Supreme Court noted, the facts of the Matsushita case are complex and lengthy.
See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 576-77 (1986). Among
the facts and issues addressed are many evidentiary issues that are not pertinent to this
Comment. Accordingly, this Comment will focus on those facts that were relevant to the
Supreme Court's analysis of the predatory pricing claim.
122. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
123. See Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
124. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588.
125. See Levine, Predatory Pricing Conspiracies After Matsushita Industrial Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp.: Can an Antitrust Plaintiff Survive the Supreme Court's Skepticism?, 22 INT'L
LAW. 529 (1988); Liebeler, supra note 3.
126. National Union Electric Corporation originally filed suit in New Jersey in 1970.
Zenith's complaint was filed separately in Pennsylvania in 1974. The two cases were
consolidated in Pennsylvania in 1974. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 577 n.1.
127. Id. at 577.
128. Id.
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by fixing and maintaining artificially high prices for television receiv-
ers in Japan, a practice which in turn subsidized the artificially low
prices set for television receivers exported to the United States.
129
The plaintiffs further claimed that the artificially low prices set for
receivers in the United States were at levels that produced substantial
losses for the defendants.1 30 This conspiracy was said to have begun
as early as 1953 and to have been in full operation by the late
1960's.131
After several years of discovery, the defendants filed motions for
summary judgment on all of the plaintiffs' claims. 132 The district
court directed the parties to file a list of all of the documentary evi-
dence that would be introduced at trial if the case were to proceed.
1 33
After the defendants challenged the admissibility of much of the
plaintiffs' evidence, the district court ruled that the bulk of the evi-
dence upon which the plaintiffs were relying was inadmissible. 1
34
The district court then granted the defendants' motions for sum-
mary judgment on the claims arising under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act. "'35 The court found that the alleged conspiracy was unlikely and
implausible because the evidence suggested that the defendants had
conspired in ways that did not injure the plaintiffs. 3 6 As to the
alleged predatory pricing conspiracy, the court found that the more
plausible inference to be drawn from the price cuts was that the
defendants were cutting prices to compete in the American market.
1 37
The court also found the claim arising under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act to be indistinguishable from the Section 1 claim. Thus, it dis-
missed the Section 2 claim.
38
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed many of the district court's evidentiary rulings, and it also
reversed the order granting the defendants' motions for summary
judgment. 139 In addition to other evidence of anticompetitive behav-
ior on the part of the defendants, the plaintiffs' expert testified that the
defendants' export sales had prices that produced losses as high as











139. Id. at 580.
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25%."'0 The court of appeals concluded that direct, as well as cir-
cumstantial, evidence existed upon which a factfinder could find a
conspiracy to depress prices in the American market, a market which
was subsidized by the excess profits accrued in the Japanese
markets.14
B. Holding
In a five to four decision, the United States Supreme Court
reversed and remanded the order of the Third Circuit, which had
reversed the district court order granting summary judgment for the
defendants. 142 Initially, the Supreme Court found that the court of
appeals had erred in considering the defendants' artificially high
prices in Japan, their limited distribution agreement,143 and their
check price agreement 144 as direct evidence of a conspiracy that had
injured the plaintiffs.'45 The Court stated that none of the aforemen-
tioned activities, insofar as the plaintiffs were concerned, were viola-
tive of the Sherman Act.
146
The Court then discussed the summary judgment standard as it
related to the facts of the case. "To survive petitioners' motion for
summary judgment," the Court stated, "[the plaintiffs] must establish
that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether petitioners
entered into an illegal conspiracy that caused [the plaintiffs] to suffer a
cognizable injury.""'' 4 Among all the allegations, the Court found
that only the predatory pricing claim could have actually caused an
injury to the plaintiffs. 4 Accordingly, only the evidence surrounding
the predatory pricing claim could be considered as evidence of the
alleged conspiracy.
49
140. Id. at 581 n.5.
141. Id. at 580-81.
142. Id. at 598.
143. The defendants had agreed to a rule whereby each Japanese producer was permitted to
sell to only five American distributors. Id. at 581.
144. This term is used for the agreement in which the Japanese producers fixed minimum
prices for electronic products exported to the American market. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 585-86.
148. Id. at 586.
149. Id. The dissent, however, criticized the majority for limiting the evidence which could
have been considered in analyzing the conspiracy to evidence pertaining to the predatory
pricing claim; the majority stated that the plaintiffs could only recover if they proved that the
"petitioners conspired to drive (plaintiffs] out of the relevant markets by (i) pricing below the
level necessary to sell their products, or (ii) pricing below some appropriate measure of cost."
Id. at 601 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 585 n.8 (majority opinion)).
The dissent found fault with the underlying premise of the majority's conclusion, that
absent proof of the two aforementioned elements, the plaintiffs could not have been harmed by
1990]
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The Supreme Court provided that the issue of fact must be genu-
ine: "[I]f the factual context renders [the plaintiffs'] claim implausi-
ble-if the claim is one that simply makes no economic sense-[the
plaintiffs] must come forward with more persuasive evidence to sup-
port [their] claim than would otherwise be necessary."' 5 ° The Court
stated that while all inferences must be drawn in a light most
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, antitrust law lim-
its the range of permissible inferences that can be drawn from ambig-
uous evidence in a Section 1 case. '5' To survive summary judgment, a
plaintiff is required to "present evidence that 'tends to exclude the
possibility' that the alleged conspirators acted independently." '52
The Court then analyzed the plaintiffs' predatory pricing claims
in light of the foregoing guidelines. The Court stated:
A predatory pricing conspiracy is by nature speculative. Any
agreement to price below the competitive level requires the con-
spirators to forgo profits that free competition would offer them.
The foregone profits may be considered an investment in the
future. For the investment to be rational, the conspirators must
have a reasonable expectation of recovering, in the form of later
the alleged conspiracy. Id. This reasoning, the dissent stated, ignored the conclusions of the
plaintiffs' expert, who had found that the plaintiffs were harmed in two ways that were in no
way connected to the defendants' pricing practices. The plaintiffs' expert, DePodwin, had
submitted a report that the dissent refers to as the "DePodwin Report." This evidence was
relied upon by the court of appeals, which reversed a district court ruling that the report was
inadmissible. Id. at 601-03.
The DePodwin Report explained that the plaintiffs were harmed by the supracompetitive
prices charged in Japan, prices that lowered Japanese consumption and resulted in the
exportation of more goods to the United States than would have occurred had the Japanese
prices been set at a competitive level. Id. at 601. The increased exports resulted in depressed
price levels in the United States, thereby harming the plaintiffs. Id. at 601-04 & n.4. The
dissent stated that this report alone created a genuine issue of fact as to whether or not the
alleged conspiracy harmed the plaintiffs. Id. at 603. The dissent criticized the majority for
denying a jury the opportunity to consider these factors simply because the majority's own
economic theories regarded the alleged scheme as implausible. Id.
150. Id. at 587.
151. Id. at 588. The Court then discussed Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465
U.S. 752 (1984), in which it held that "conduct as consistent with permissible competition as
with illegal conspiracy does not, standing alone, support an inference of antitrust conspiracy."
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588.
152. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588 (citing Monsanto Co., 465 U.S. at 764). In dealing with
the summary judgment standard, the dissent criticized the language used by the majority,
wherein the majority stated that the Third Circuit "apparently did not consider whether it was
as plausible to conclude that petitioners' price-cutting behavior was independent and not
conspiratorial." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 599-600 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 581
(majority opinion)). Such language, the dissent stated, implies that the trial judge hearing a
summary judgment motion should decide for himself if the weight of the evidence favors the
plaintiff. Id. Moreover, the dissent stated that such an implication undermines the traditional
summary judgment doctrine, namely, that all evidence must be construed in the light most
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Id. at 601.
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monopoly profits, more than the losses suffered.15 3
The Supreme Court further stated that a predator must make a sub-
stantial investment, in the form of lost profits, with no assurance that
it will pay off. 54 Accordingly, the Court agreed with those commen-
tators who had concluded that predatory pricing schemes are rarely
tried, and if tried, are rarely successful.' 55
The Court gave little weight to the expert testimony indicating
that the defendants had sold their products in America at substantial
losses.' 56 The Court stated that the study upon which the testimony
was based relied upon assumptions derived from the plaintiffs' costs
and not from the defendants' actual cost data. 57 According to the
Court, the "expert opinion evidence of below-cost pricing has little
probative value in comparison with the economic factors . . . that
suggest that such conduct is irrational."' 58
The Court further stated that the predatory pricing claim, as
alleged by the plaintiffs, was especially implausible in light of two con-
siderations. First, the plaintiffs had alleged that a large number of
firms had conspired over many years to charge less than market
prices in order to attain a monopoly. Although it is difficult for a
single predator firm to benefit economically from predatory pricing,
the Court found that the type of conspiracy alleged by the plaintiffs
was "incalculably more difficult to execute than an analogous plan
153. Id. at 588-89.
154. Id. at 589 (citing Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI.
L. REv. 263, 268 (1981)).
155. Id. (citing Northeastern Tel. Co. v. AT&T, 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 943 (1982); R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 145 (1978); Areeda & Turner,
supra note 2, at 699; Easterbrook, supra note 154, at 263; Koller, supra note 21; McGee,
Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 23 J.L. & ECON. 289, 292-94 (1980)).
156. Id. at 594 n. 19. The district court ruled that this testimony and the study upon which
it was based was inadmissible. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F.
Supp. 1125, 1313 (E.D. Pa. 1981). The court of appeals reversed and found the testimony
admissible. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983).
157. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 594 n.19.
158. Id. The dissent was critical of the majority's allegations that the Third Circuit had
erred in not being sufficiently skeptical of the plaintiffs' claims that the defendants had engaged
in predatory pricing. Id. at 605-07. (White, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that the
majority had erred in considering the probative value of the plaintiffs' expert testimony
indicating that the defendants had sold their electronic products in the United States at a loss.
Id. at 606. The dissent stated:
[T]he question is not whether the Court finds respondents' experts persuasive, or
prefers the District Court analysis; it is whether, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to respondents, a jury or other factfinder could reasonably
conclude that petitioners engaged in long-term, below cost sales. I agree with the
Third Circuit that the answer to this question is "yes."
1990]
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undertaken by a single predator."' 59
Second, the Court also found the plaintiffs' predatory pricing
claim implausible in light of the defendants' inability to attain monop-
oly power. I I After two decades, the defendants had not attained the
requisite market power to enable them to charge the supracompetitive
prices (prices substantially higher than normal competitive prices)
that were necessary to recoup lost profits.' Even if the alleged con-
spiracy had been fueled by the supracompetitive prices charged in
Japan, the Court stated that it would make no sense for the defend-
ants to sustain losses absent a strong likelihood that the conspiracy
would eventually pay off. The Court looked upon the failure of the
conspiracy to achieve the allegedly desired ends as evidence that the
conspiracy did not, in fact, ever exist.' 62
Specifically, the Court stated that the court of appeals had erred
in two respects: (1) it had relied on evidence which had little, if any
relevance, to the predatory pricing claim;' 63 and (2) it had failed to
consider the implausibility of the alleged predatory pricing conspiracy
in light of the lack of economic motive for such a conspiracy."6 The
Court found the absence of any plausible motive to be determinative
of the question of whether there was a genuine issue for trial within
the meaning of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 65
159. Id. at 590. The Court implied that a predatory pricing claim brought pursuant to
Section 2 of the Sherman Act would be more plausible than the same claim brought pursuant
to Section 1. Id. Additionally, the Court stated that successful predatory pricing conspiracies
involving a large number of firms can be identified and punished once successful because such
schemes require some price fixing agreement setting a minimum price in order to recoup lost
profits. Id. at 595.
160. Id. at 590-91.
161. Id. The plaintiffs also failed to offer evidence which would show that entry into the
relevant market was especially difficult. As such, the Court stated that it would have been
nearly impossible for the defendants to maintain supracompetitive prices even if they had
attained monopoly power. Id. at 591 n.15.
162. Id. at 592.
163. Id. at 595. The dissent criticized the majority for finding errors in the Third Circuit
opinion where none existed. Id. at 604 (White, J., dissenting). The majority stated that the
Third Circuit had erred in considering both the evidence of price fixing in Japan and the
limited distribution agreement as direct evidence of a conspiracy that injured the plaintiffs. Id.
at 595-96. The dissent disagreed, stating that "[tihe passage from the Third Circuit's opinion
in which the [majority] locates this alleged error makes . . . a quite simple and correct
observation, namely, that this case differs from traditional conscious parallelism cases, in that
there is direct evidence of concert of action among petitioners." Id. at 604-05 (White, J.,
dissenting). The Third Circuit, after what the dissent considered careful deliberation, then
noted that while these horizontal agreements allocating customers usually do not harm
competitors, the evidence as presented would have permitted a factfinder to infer an antitrust
injury to the plaintiffs. Id. at 605. The dissent found no error in the Third Circuit's reasoning.
Id.
164. Id. at 595.
165. Id. at 596-97.
PREDATOR Y PRICING
Specifically, the Court stated that the "[l]ack of motive bears on the
range of permissible conclusions that might be drawn from ambigu-
ous evidence: if petitioners had no rational economic motive to con-
spire, and if their conduct is consistent with other, equally plausible
explanations, the conduct does not give rise to an inference of
conspiracy." 166
The Supreme Court remanded the case for a determination of
whether other, less ambiguous, evidence existed that would permit a
trier of fact to find the alleged conspiracy. 167 The Court stated that
such evidence must tend to exclude the possibility that the defend-
ants' pricing strategies had been used merely to compete for busi-
ness.' 68 In the absence of such evidence, the Court stated that there
existed no genuine issue for trial.
69
C. Analysis
Although the Supreme Court specifically refused to decide what
measure of cost is appropriate in resolving predatory pricing claims
170
or what test is appropriate for the resolution of such claims, the lan-
guage of Matsushita indicates a preference for the cost-determinative
approach utilized by the First and Second Circuits. The Supreme
Court defined "predatory pricing" under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act as "pricing below some appropriate measure of cost.' 17 ' The
Court did not consider, however, whether recovery should ever be
available under Section 1 when the challenged pricing is above some
measure of incremental cost. 1 72 Relying on the Areeda-Turner arti-
cle, however, the Court did state that, "[a]s a practical matter, it may
be that only direct evidence of below-cost pricing is sufficient to over-
come the strong inference that rational businesses would not enter
into conspiracies such as this one."'' 73 This philosophy would proba-
bly also carry over to Section 2 claims.
The skepticism with which the Supreme Court views predatory
pricing schemes is further evidence that the Court favors the cost-
166. Id. at 597.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 597-98.
169. Id. at 598.
170. Id. at 585 n.8. The Court stated that "Itihere is a good deal of debate, both in cases
and in the law reviews, about what 'cost' is relevant in [Section 2] cases," but it also found that
it "need not resolve this debate here, because unlike the cases cited above, this is a Sherman
Act section 1 case." Id.
171. Id. at 585 (citing Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 232-35 (1st
Cir. 1983)).
172. Id. at 585 n.9.
173. Id.
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determinative approach.'74 This skepticism also inheres in the posi-
tions of the First and Second Circuits, which utilize a cost-determina-
tive test. The Supreme Court agreed with those commentators who
had stated that predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried and rarely
successful, 175 and it also seemed to agree with the position that such
behavior is unlikely to increase in the future.
176
Although some authors have speculated that Matsushita would
signal an end to successful predatory pricing claims, 177 the decision
can also be construed in quite a different way. The Supreme Court
stated that its decision hinged upon the analysis of the conspiracy ele-
ment of a Section 1 claim. 178 The Court also implied that allegations
of predatory pricing are slightly more plausible in the context of Sec-
tion 2 single-firm claims.' 79 Accordingly, the decision has been rou-
tinely ignored in the resolution of Section 2 claims. 8'
The analysis in Matsushita was also extremely fact specific. The
alleged conspiracy had originated in 1953 and had been in operation
without any hint of success for approximately twenty years.' Addi-
tionally, it was alleged that twenty-one firms were involved in the con-
spiracy.18 2 Moreover, the plaintiffs-not the defendant firms-held
the relatively larger share of the retail television market.' 1 3 The Mat-
sushita Court relied upon the aforementioned facts in deciding that
the alleged scheme was implausible, but the decision was only five to
four in favor of the defendants.' 84 Had these facts not been present or
had the claim been brought pursuant to Section 2, the majority may
have viewed the alleged predatory behavior with significantly less
skepticism.
V. CASES FOLLOWING MATSUSHITA
Although some commentators have predicted the demise of suc-
cessful predatory pricing claims, 1 5 this has not occurred. In fact,
Matsushita has had little effect on those courts of appeals that view
174. Id. at 588-91.
175. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
176. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 590.
177. See supra note 118.
178. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 585 n.9.
179. See id. at 590.
180. See, e.g., Instructional Sys. Dev. Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 817 F.2d 639
(10th Cir. 1987); Marsann Co. v. Brammal, Inc., 788 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1986).
181. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 578.
182. Id. at 577.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See supra notes 118 & 171.
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predatory pricing claims with less skepticism than the Supreme
Court.1 8 6 Where courts already had been skeptical of the motivation
behind predatory pricing schemes and the likelihood of their exist-
ence, however, Matsushita has had devastating effects on predatory
pricing plaintiffs. Many cases are now summarily dismissed or
defeated pursuant to the authority of Matsushita."8 7 The following
three subsections will examine the effect Matsushita has had on the
cases subsequently decided under the three different approaches uti-
lized by the United States courts of appeals.
A. The Cost-Determinative Approach
As of this writing, the First, Second, and Fifth Circuits have each
decided one predatory pricing case after Matsushita. In these three
cases, only one plaintiff was able to reach the jury; in that case, how-
ever, the plaintiff did in fact prevail on his predatory pricing claim. I"
in Kelco Disposal,. Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc., a
sanitation company brought a predatory pricing claim against a com-
petitor under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The plaintiff introduced
evidence that the defendant had priced its disposal services below its
average variable cost. The plaintiff's expert witness testified that dur-
ing the relevant period, from 1982 to 1984, the defendant's average
variable cost for roll-off waste services 90 was roughly $104 per haul,
yet the defendant charged only $65 per haul. 9 The defendant dis-
puted the plaintiff's estimate of its average variable cost on the basis
that fixed costs (equipment depreciation) had been considered as vari-
able costs.' 92 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit stated that "the characterization of legitimately disputed costs is
a question of fact for the jury."'1 93 Because the jury could have rea-
sonably characterized equipment depreciation as a variable cost and
because the inclusion of this item in the computation of variable cost
raised the average variable cost above the $65 charged per haul,' 94 the
Second Circuit upheld the jury verdict for the plaintiff.
186. See infra notes 215-19 & 245-59 and accompanying text.
187. See infra notes 210-16 & 267-71 and accompanying text.
188. See Kelco Disposal, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 845 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1988),
aff'd on other grounds, 109 S. Ct. 2909 (1989).
189. 845 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1988), aff'd on other grounds, 109 S. Ct. 2909 (1989).
190. Roll-off waste collection is a process of waste removal, usually performed at large
industrial locations. Id. at 406.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 408.
194. When equipment depreciation was considered to be a variable cost, the defendant's
average cost per haul was $81. Id.
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The plaintiff also had other, non-economic proof of predatory
pricing by the defendant. 95 In fact, the plaintiff introduced evidence
that the defendant had intended to put it out of the sanitation busi-
ness. The defendant's district manager was told: "Put [the plaintiff]
out of business. Do whatever it takes. Squish [it] like a bug. '
Although the Second Circuit did not explicitly consider the relevance
of intent, this evidence may have been influential in the court's accept-
ance of both the jury verdict and the price characterization.
The Second Circuit's reasoning in Kelco did not, however, rely
upon Matsushita. There are three possible reasons for this. First, the
Second Circuit may not have considered Matsushita applicable to
claims brought under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 197 Second, the
court may not have considered Matsushita applicable because the evi-
dence of predatory pricing was so overwhelming in Kelco. The Sec-
ond Circuit may have construed Matsushita to apply only to cases in
which a defendant's motivation for a predatory pricing scheme, and
the likelihood of such a scheme's success were more tenuous than in
Kelco. Finally, the Second Circuit may have been reluctant to cite
Matsushita because it did not support their finding of predatory pric-
ing. In Matsushita, the Supreme Court had stated that the incidence
of predatory pricing was rare due to economic considerations. This
conclusion would not have been supportive of the Second Circuit's
finding that the Kelco defendant did, in fact, engage in a predatory
pricing scheme to put the plaintiff out of business.
Kelco was the first case in which the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a predatory pricing claim. In
cases prior to Matsushita, the Second Circuit had consistently
reversed those decisions in which predatory pricing was found.' 98 In
Kelco, however, the Second Circuit affirmed a jury verdict in which
predatory pricing was found. This implicitly indicates that the
Supreme Court's decision in Matsushita has had little or no effect on
the Second Circuit's analysis of predatory pricing claims. Thus, the
Second Circuit has not adopted the Supreme Court's skepticism.
Although the First Circuit cited Matsushita in Clamp-All Corp.
195. Id. at 406. In fact the jury had considered evidence of the defendant's subjective intent
to drive the plaintiff out of business. Id.
196. Id.
197. Since Matsushita decided a predatory pricing claim brought under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, the court may have construed Matsushita as other courts have: that it was
decided pursuant to a finding that no conspiracy could likely have existed, not that a predatory
pricing scheme did not exist. See infra text accompanying notes 215-20.




v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Institute,199 it chose not to place much emphasis
on the opinion. In Clamp-All, a pipe coupling manufacturer sued an
association of coupling manufacturers alleging violations of both Sec-
tions 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act,2°° as well as violations of Section 43
of the Lanham Act.201 The Section 2 claim was predicated upon alle-
gations of predatory pricing.
The plaintiff introduced evidence showing that two firms in the
association had price lists reflecting that their "returns" were less
than their "costs. '20 2 Additionally, witnesses testified that the presi-
dent of one of these two firms, the industry price leader, had stated
that the firm would not raise its prices until a competitor went out of
business.20 3 Once the competitor actually went out of business, that
firm, along with other firms in the association, raised its prices.
2 °4
The First Circuit, relying primarily on its decision in Barry
Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp. ,2 °5 affirmed the district court
order directing a verdict for the defendant.20 6 Despite the extensive
testimony offered by the plaintiff, the First Circuit adhered to the
rigid cost-determinative approach established in Barry Wright, and
stated that the plaintiff had not introduced evidence that the defend-
ant had priced its couplings below average variable cost. The court
dismissed the relevancy of the price lists by stating that no evidence
had been introduced explaining the relationship between the cost and
price figures on the subject price lists. Thus, no reasonable jury could
have found below-cost pricing based only on such a list.
2 7
The First Circuit also minimized the effect of the statements that
prices would not be raised while a certain competitor remained in
business. The court stated that the remark and subsequent conduct
"simply shows (at best) a price increase after the demise of a competi-
tor; it does not significantly help show that the relevant prices were
unlawfully low to begin with."'20 8 This treatment of the remark is
especially interesting in light of the court's own definition of preda-
tory pricing. The court stated:
"[P]redatory pricing" occurs when a firm sets its prices temporar-
ily below its costs, with the hope that the low price will drive a
199. 851 F.2d 478 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 789 (1989).
200. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1988).
201. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988).
202. Clamp-All, 851 F.2d at 482.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. 724 F.2d 227 (lst Cir. 1983).
206. Clamp-All, 851 F.2d at 478.
207. Id. at 483.
208. Id.
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competitor out of business, after which the "predatory" firm will
raise its prices so high that it will recoup its temporary losses and
earn additional profit, all before new firms, attracted by the high
prices, enter its market and force prices down.2°
The First Circuit's analysis of the statements of the president of
the alleged predator is in direct conflict with the foregoing definition.
If the jury had accepted the testimony, then the jury could have rea-
sonably concluded that the defendant had engaged in predatory pric-
ing. The testimony indicated that the president had allegedly stated
that his firm would only raise its prices after a competitor was forced
out of business. Subsequently, after the competitor was forced out of
business, the alleged predator firm and others in the association did
indeed raise their prices. In light of this testimony, the directed ver-
dict for the defendant was in conflict with the First Circuit's own defi-
nition of predatory pricing. A reasonable jury could have properly
found that the defendant had engaged in a predatory pricing scheme.
Of the three courts of appeals utilizing a cost-determinative
approach, the Fifth Circuit is the only one that summarily dismissed a
predatory pricing claim pursuant to the authority of Matsushita. In
Stitt Spark Plug Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co. ,210 a manufacturer
of industrial spark plugs brought a Section 2 action against a com-
peting manufacturer, alleging predatory pricing as the predicate
anticompetitive conduct. The plaintiff premised its claim upon the
fact that the defendant sold spark plugs to original equipment manu-
facturers at prices well below the price of replacement parts, even
though the products were identical. 21 1 The plaintiff alleged that, in so
doing, the defendant was hoping to capitalize on the public's desire to
replace the spark plugs with the same brand as the originals.
Relying primarily upon Matsushita, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a
directed verdict for the defendant.21 2 The court, adopting Matsu-
shita's inherent skepticism of the viability of a predatory pricing
scheme, stated that "economic disincentives to predatory pricing
often will justify a presumption that an allegation of such behavior is
implausible. 21 3 Therefore, in predatory pricing claims, the court
stated that "[plaintiffs] must come forward with more persuasive evi-
dence to support their claim than would otherwise be necessary [to
209. Id. (citing Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983)).
210. 840 F.2d 1253 (5th Cir. 1988).
211. Id. at 1255.
212. Id. at 1256.
213. Id. at 1255.
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avoid summary judgment]."'2 4 The court adjudged the predatory
pricing claim implausible because the plaintiff had never proved that
the defendant's recoupment of losses on sales below cost depended
upon it being forced from the market.215 Accordingly, the court
stated: "Without an economically plausible theory of anticompetitive
effect, [the plaintiff] was not entitled to reach the jury on the preda-
tory-pricing." '216
It is apparent that the Fifth Circuit will utilize Matsushita as a
tool to summarily dismiss predatory pricing claims. The Fifth Circuit
interpreted Matsushita to mean that, generally, allegations of preda-
tory pricing are implausible due to economic disincentives.217 The
court further requires an economically plausible theory of anticompe-
titive effect before it will allow a plaintiff to reach the jury. When
juxtaposed, these positions will justify the Fifth Circuit's pretrial dis-
missal of predatory pricing claims unless a plaintiff can meet an ele-
vated burden of proof.2 1 I The exact nature of this added burden is
unknown to potential plaintiffs, and it will continue to be unknown
until the Supreme Court or the Fifth Circuit clarify their respective
positions. Accordingly, there is a lack of any meaningful guidance to
potential litigants, in addition to a blatant deviation from accepted
Supreme Court guidelines governing summary judgments. In the
Fifth Circuit in particular, Matsushita has significantly affected a
predatory pricing plaintiff's right to a jury trial. In light of the many
criticisms as to the economic inaccuracies of the Areeda-Turner
test,219 this is sure to result in the dismissal of perfectly valid preda-
tory pricing claims.
B. Circuits Utilizing the Cost-Price Relationship to Allocate the
Burden of Proof
Matsushita has had little effect on the predatory pricing test
implemented by the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits. At the time of this
214. Id. (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986)).
215. Id. at 1256. The court also stated that the plaintiff had not presented sufficient
evidence of the defendant's pricing practices at both market levels-the original market and
the replacement market. Id. Accordingly, the court stated that it was unable to analyze
properly the relationship between price and cost. Id.
216. Id. at 1255.
217. Id.
218. The Fifth Circuit stated that in predatory pricing claims, a plaintiff must come forward
with more persuasive evidence than would otherwise be necessary to avoid summary
judgment. Id. (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.).
219. See, e.g., McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1495-96 (1 1th Cir.
1988).
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writing, the Eleventh Circuit has decided one predatory pricing claim
subsequent to Matsushita, and the Ninth Circuit has decided three
such claims. The Sixth Circuit, however, has not yet had the opportu-
nity to address the issue in light of Matsushita. The Ninth and Elev-
enth Circuits continue to take a more objective view of allegations of
predatory pricing than do the circuits utilizing the cost-determinative
approach. The Areeda-Turner skepticism and the Supreme Court's
presumptions in Matsushita that economic disincentives make preda-
tory pricing schemes implausible have not been determinative. Specif-
ically, the Ninth Circuit has limited Matsushita as applying only to
the conspiracy element of a Section 1 claim.220 Consequently, a plain-
tiff in the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits has a much greater chance of
prevailing than a plaintiff in the First, Second, or Fifth Circuits.
As previously mentioned, the Ninth Circuit has not adopted the
Supreme Court's skepticism. In Marsann Co. v. Brammall, Inc.,221
the Ninth Circuit distinguished Matsushita and maintained its pre-
Matsushita position that a predatory pricing plaintiff need not prove
pricing below any measure of cost in order to survive summary judg-
ment.222 Earlier, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California granted summary judgment for the defendant
due to the plaintiff's inability to prove the existence of prices below
average variable cost.2 3  The Ninth Circuit reversed, stating that
Matsushita did not undermine prior Ninth Circuit precedent allowing
a plaintiff to prevail even if evidence of below-cost pricing was not
introduced.22 The court stated: "The Supreme Court's opinion dis-
cusses only the amount of evidence required to allow a factfinder to
infer the existence of a conspiracy punishable under section 1 of the
Sherman Act . . . . This case, of course, arises under section 2
.... "225 The Ninth Circuit's reading of Matsushita thus limits its
application to the less common Section 1 claims for multiple-firm
pricing rather than to the single-firm claims under Section 2. 226
220. See infra text accompanying notes 221-25.
221. 788 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1986).
222. Id. at 613 n.1.
223. Id. at 613.
224. See, e.g., Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM, 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 955 (1983); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668
F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
225. Marsann, 788 F.2d at 613 n.1.
226. In a subsequent case, Medic Air Corp. v. Air Ambulance Authority, 843 F.2d 1187
(9th Cir. 1988), the Ninth Circuit again ignored the Supreme Court's skepticism and reversed
a summary judgment in favor of the defendants. In Medic, an air ambulance service brought
an antitrust claim against a competitor, hospitals, and the county under both Sections 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act. Id. The defendant argued that its conduct was authorized by the state
and was consequently immune from the antitrust laws. Id. at 1188-89. The Ninth Circuit
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The Eleventh Circuit formally adopted an approach similar to
that of the Ninth Circuit in McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co. 227
The Eleventh Circuit's approach, however, is slightly different than
that utilized by the Ninth Circuit. Whereas the Ninth Circuit is will-
ing to consider other circumstantial evidence of predatory pricing in
addition to the cost-price analysis,228 the only additional evidence that
the Eleventh Circuit will consider is the subjective intent of the
defendant. Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit's approach differs from
the Ninth Circuit's in that the Eleventh Circuit holds that prices
above average total cost are conclusively deemed to be lawful.
In McGahee, a small propane gas distributor sued a competitor,
who was also his former employer, alleging predatory pricing. 229 The
plaintiff (Floyd McGahee) introduced evidence that the defendant's
district manager had referred to him in internal documents as "Floyd
the S.O.B."'2 30 and had set a goal to "[c]ontribute to Floyd's financial
problems." '231 The plaintiff also introduced undisputed evidence that
the defendant had sold propane gas at prices below its average total
cost. Moreover, the plaintiff contended that the defendant's own doc-
uments indicated that, in some months, the defendant had sold pro-
pane at prices below its average variable cost.
23 2
The district court applied the Areeda-Turner cost-determinative
found no such immunity and stated that "[a] triable issue of fact exists as to whether [the
defendants] engaged in such [predatory] behavior." Id. at 1190.
In Taggart v. Rutledge, 852 F.2d 1290 (9th Cir. 1988), decided approximately three
months later, the plaintiffs attempted to prove predatory pricing by showing that the
defendant, a retail competitor and wholesale distributor of gasoline, sold gasoline at retail
prices that were lower than the wholesale price he charged the plaintiffs. Id. The plaintiffs
never attempted to provide any evidence of the defendant's cost, however, nor did they attempt
to show that the defendant had sacrificed profits or incurred losses in order to drive them out
of the market. Accordingly, a district court order granting summary judgment for the
defendant was affirmed. Id.
It is interesting to note that the Ninth Circuit did not refer to Matsushita in affirming the
summary judgment in Taggart. The trilogy of cases decided after Matsushita clearly and
conclusively indicate that the Supreme Court decision has had no effect on subsequent Ninth
Circuit predatory pricing decisions. The Ninth Circuit has construed Matsushita as being
applicable to summary judgment motions attacking the conspiracy element of Section 1 claims.
It has not had any effect upon the Ninth Circuit's analysis of Section 2 predatory pricing
claims.
227. 858 F.2d 1487 (11 th Cir. 1988). Prior to McGahee, the Eleventh Circuit' had utilized
the same approach as the Fifth Circuit. For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's approach, see
supra notes 79-102 and accompanying text.
228. See text accompanying note 92.
229. McGahee, 858 F.2d at 1492.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. The Eleventh Circuit stated that the evidence of prices below average variable cost
was not persuasive. Id. at 1492 n.5.
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test as enunciated by the Fifth Circuit in International Air Industries,
Inc. v. American Excelsior Co.233 Initially, the district court found
that the propane market had no significant barriers to entry.234 Upon
this finding and a finding that the plaintiff had not introduced any
evidence that the defendant had sold below its average variable cost,
the district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment.2 35  The court ignored evidence of the defendant's subjective
intent, stating that "the Court cannot and need not divine the intent
behind defendant's pricing policy.
2 36
The Eleventh Circuit, addressing the issue as a matter of first
impression, reversed the trial court order granting the defendant's
motion for summary judgment.2 37 The court focused on the antitrust
statutes and their legislative history,2 38 as well as on judicial prece-
dents, in deciding that the test for predatory pricing must consider
evidence of subjective intent as well as evidence of the defendant's
prices as they relate to cost.2 39 The Eleventh Circuit fashioned the
following test: If the defendant's prices were above average total
cost,24° then there is no predatory pricing and no circumstantial
evidence of predatory intent.24' If the defendant's prices were
below average total cost, then there is circumstantial evidence of pred-
atory intent.242 To survive summary judgment, however, a plaintiff
must present other evidence, either subjective or objective, of preda-
tory intent.243 If the defendant's prices were below average variable
233. 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976), discussed supra in notes
64-66 and accompanying text. This approach utilizes the Areeda-Turner guidelines, but
provides for an exception in those markets with high barriers to market entry. In those
markets, a plaintiff can prevail by showing that the defendant's prices were below the short-run
profit-maximizing price. For a complete discussion of the former Fifth Circuit approach, see
supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
234. McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 658 F. Supp. 189, 195 (N.D. Ga.. 1987), rev'd,
858 F.2d 1487 (1 1th Cir. 1988).
235. Id. at 197.
236. Id. at 192.
237. McGahee, 858 F.2d at 1507.
238. The court examined the legislative history surrounding discriminatory pricing under
the Clayton Act and arrived at the conclusion that subjective intent was a relevant factor in
determining anticompetitive conduct. Id. at 1498.
239. Id. at 1496.
240. The court stated that average total cost should be measured by long-run marginal cost,
but further stated that fully distributed cost is acceptable as a surrogate in appropriate cases.
Id. at 1503. For definitions of these measures of cost, see supra notes 22, 31 & 32. The court
did not explain what constituted "appropriate cases."
241. McGahee, 858 F.2d at 1503.
242. Id.
243. Id. The court further stated that the closer a defendant's price is to average total cost,
the stronger the other evidence must be for the plaintiff to avoid summary judgment. Id.
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cost,2" a rebuttable presumption of predatory intent is raised.245 If
other evidence of intent, subjective or objective, is sufficiently proba-
tive of predatory intent, then that element of a claim for attempted
monopolization under Section 2 is satisfied.246
The Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintff in McGahee had
introduced evidence from which a factfinder could infer predatory
intent.247 Initially, the court noted that the defendant had not argued
that its prices were above average total cost. Accordingly, there was
circumstantial evidence of predatory intent.248 The plaintiff nonethe-
less presented other evidence of predatory intent. The "other evi-
dence" consisted of the defendant's investigation of the plaintiff's
financial position, the defendant's policy of providing its customers
with rent-free gas tanks in order to take advantage of the plaintiff's
poor financial position, and the internal memorandum declaring the
"contribution to [the plaintiff's] financial problems" as a regional
goal.2 49 Additionally, the court considered evidence that, if accepted
by the trier of fact, showed that the defendant had sold gas at prices
below its average variable cost. 25 ° As a result of the foregoing evi-
dence, summary judgment for the defendant was inappropriate under
the circuit's newly-established test.
The Eleventh Circuit, like the Ninth, did not seem to place much
reliance upon Matsushita even though it was deciding the validity of a
summary judgment motion. Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit did not
adopt the Supreme Court's skepticism. Of the two courts of appeals
that have decided predatory pricing claims after Matsushita
by utilizing the cost-price relationship to allocate the burden of proof,
neither seem to have been influenced in any way by the Matsushita
decision. An analysis of the result of the four cases decided by these
courts subsequent to Matsushita bears this out. In only one of the
four cases was the plaintiff unable to reach the jury.2"'
C. Circuits Utilizing a Totality of the Circumstances Approach
Matsushita has had a different effect on the Seventh Circuit than
244. The court stated that average variable cost can be used as a surrogate for short-run
marginal cost. Id. at 1504. For a definition of average variable cost, see supra note 35.
245. McGahee, 858 F.2d at 1504.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
249. McGahee, 858 F.2d at 1504.
250. Id.
251. In one of those, the plaintiff had a misguided notion of predatory pricing law and what
was required to establish a violation. Taggart v. Rutledge, 852 F.2d 1290 (9th Cir. 1988).
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it has had on the Tenth Circuit. Each of these courts of appeals has
decided one predatory pricing case subsequent to Matsushita, but
each has taken a different approach. Although the Tenth Circuit had
committed itself to an approach which considers all of the circum-
stances surrounding a defendant's pricing practices, thereby giving a
plaintiff a fair opportunity to present a predatory pricing claim, the
Seventh Circuit has adopted the Supreme Court's skepticism regard-
ing the viability of predatory pricing claims, along with what seems to
be a cost-determinative approach.
In Instructional Systems Development Corp. v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co. ,252 a competitor in the driver simulator market sued the
developer of various driving simulation systems and a manufacturer
of driver simulation devices under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act. The plaintiff alleged that the equipment manufacturer named as
a defendant had undertaken predatory pricing in order to achieve a
monopoly in the simulator market.253 The district court granted this
defendant's motion for summary judgment, due in large part to the
finding that its prices were above average variable cost.
254
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
reversed the trial court's order granting summary judgment.255 The
court reiterated its prior position that "sales above average variable
cost do not preclude a finding of predatory pricing if other factors are
present indicating unreasonably anticompetitive behavior." 256 The
court found that the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence, as a
whole, to create a factual issue on whether the defendant-manufac-
turer had engaged in short-term price cutting to secure long-term
monopoly profits.257
Indeed, the plaintiff had introduced substantial evidence that the
defendant-manufacturer had engaged in predatory pricing. Between
the time that a chief competitor of this defendant had left the market
and the time that the plaintiff entered the market-a period during
which the defendant was the only manufacturer-the market price of
simulators increased dramatically.25 8 After the plaintiff entered the
market, however, the defendant's prices underwent an immediate and
dramatic drop. 259 After the plaintiff went out of business, these prices
252. 817 F.2d 639 (10th Cir. 1987).
253. Id. at 647-48.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 640.
256. Id. at 648.





once again rose sharply.2" The plaintiff's expert testified that this
pricing pattern was of a predatory character.261
The plaintiff also introduced evidence showing that when the
defendant-manufacturer bid against the plaintiff, it priced its product
below the minimum price established in its pricing book.2 62 Addition-
ally, the defendant's national sales manager had stated in a deposition
that his goal was to put the plaintiff out of business.2 63 A field super-
visor of the main purchaser of simulator equipment also testified that
this defendant's national sales manager had admitted that he was
going to set a price below the level at which the defendant could make
a profit, thereby taking business away from the plaintiff. Further, this
sales manager added that the defendant could outlast the plaintiff in
an underbidding business environment.26
Although the Tenth Circuit considered this substantial evidence,
other courts would have routinely dismissed the plaintiff's predatory
pricing claim. Had this action been brought in the First, Second, or
Fifth Circuits, the pricing practices at issue would have been deemed
lawful because the prices were above average variable cost. In the
Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, the burden of proof established
by the cost-price analysis may well have been too difficult for the
plaintiff to have overcome. Yet, when the facts of the case are ana-
lyzed in accordance with the Fifth and Sixth Circuits' accepted defini-
tion of predatory pricing, 26 1 it is clear that there was predatory
pricing of the simulator equipment. The defendant-manufacturer's
prices fluctuated dramatically. When it was the only manufacturer in
the market, the price was exorbitantly high; if it was competing with
other manufacturers, the price was extraordinarily low. This case,
more than any other, exemplifies the inherent deficiencies of other
approaches. Thus, only the Tenth Circuit's approach provides the
plaintiff with a fair review of alleged violations.
Interestingly, the Tenth Circuit did not consider Matsushita in
deciding the predatory pricing claim. It did consider Matsushita
applicable, however, in deciding the claim arising under Section 1 of
the Sherman Act. Like the Ninth Circuit, the court construed the
decision in Matsushita as governing summary judgment in Section 1




263. Id. at 647.
264. Id. at 649.
265. For a discussion of the Sixth Circuit's definition, see supra notes 98-99 and
accompanying text.
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1 plaintiff, according to the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of Matsu-
shita, "must present evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that
the alleged conspirators acted independently." '266 Accordingly, the
Matsushita decision has not affected the Tenth Circuit's analysis of
predatory pricing claims.
In Indiana Grocery, Inc. v. Super Valu Stores, Inc. ,267 the Seventh
Circuit took an approach quite different from the Tenth Circuit's
approach towards allegations of predatory pricing. In Indiana Gro-
cery, a retail grocery company sued a competitor alleging predatory
pricing in the Indianapolis retail grocery market. 268 Relying on Mat-
sushita, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's order grant-
ing the defendant summary judgment.269 The court stated that the
plaintiff had not met the burden established in Matsushita, a burden
that requires an antitrust plaintiff opposing a motion for summary
judgment to present evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that
the defendant's conduct was as consistent with competition as with
illegal conduct.27 ° The court found that the more plausible inference
to be drawn from the evidence of a price reduction was that the
defendant's prices had been lowered in an effort to compete with other
retail grocers in the area.2 7 ' Although the Seventh Circuit will con-
tinue to examine predatory pricing claims by focusing on the totality
of the circumstances, it will do so within the more rigid guidelines
established in Matsushita.
VI. CONCLUSION
After Matsushita, the United States Courts of Appeals are still
divided regarding the most appropriate test with which to analyze
antitrust actions predicated upon allegations of predatory pricing.
The Supreme Court decision in Matsushita refused to specifically
address this issue and, as a result, did not resolve the split among the
courts of appeals.272 Consequently, a plaintiff bringing a predatory
pricing claim in the Tenth Circuit has a much better chance of success
than a similar plaintiff bringing a similar claim in the First, Second, or
Fifth Circuits. 273 Additionally, the approaches differ among these
266. Instructional Sys., 817 F.2d at 649 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986)).
267. 864 F.2d 1409 (7th Cir. 1988).
268. id. at 1412.
269. Id. at 1421.
270. Id. at 1412-13.
271. Id.
272. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585 n.8 (1986).
273. See, e.g., Instructional Sys. Dev. Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 817 F.2d 639
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courts of appeals. For example, the Second Circuit would allow a
monopolist to present evidence that its below-cost pricing was promo-
tional or that its prices were set in an effort to meet a competitor's
price. The First and Fifth Circuits would not allow such a defense.
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit provides that a plaintiff need not pro-
duce evidence that a price is below average variable cost if it can be
shown that there are high barriers to relevant market entry. The First
and Second Circuits do not allow such an exception. The same dis-
cord is also evident among those courts utilizing measures of cost to
allocate the burden of proof. While the Eleventh Circuit holds that
prices above average total cost are lawful, the Ninth Circuit would
allow a plaintiff to recover even if the defendant's prices were above
average total cost, but only upon a showing of clear and convincing
evidence of predatory intent.
Although the Supreme Court has not specifically considered the
relative merits of the various tests, the language of Matsushita im-
plicitly indicates that the Court will adopt the cost-determinative
approach utilized by the First and Second Circuits. The Supreme
Court has adopted the Areeda-Turner skepticism regarding predatory
pricing, as have those courts of appeals that utilize the cost-determi-
native approach. While this approach is administratively efficient, it
does not provide a proper framework within which to analyze preda-
tory pricing claims. On the other hand, the totality of the circum-
stances approach utilized by the Tenth Circuit provides a
comprehensive framework within which to analyze predatory pricing
claims. Although total cost is relevant in the analysis, it is not deter-
minative. Other relevant factors274 are given equal considerations.
The benefits inherent in such a system far outweigh any administra-
tive problems which may arise. In addressing the administrative
questions, it is important to note that the cost-determinative approach
has not precluded claims wherein a plaintiff has no evidence that the
defendant's prices are below average variable cost.275 Moreover, there
is no evidence that there are a greater number of predatory pricing
claims in those courts of appeals which utilize a totality of the circum-
stances approach than there are in those courts utilizing other
(10th Cir. 1987). Had this claim been brought in the First, Second, or Fifth Circuits, the
defendant would have prevailed because there was no evidence of pricing below average
variable cost.
274. For a discussion of the other factors, see text accompanying note 92.
275. See, e.g., Barry Wright v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983);
Northeastern Tel. Co. v. AT&T, 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982);
International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976).
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approaches. Consequently, there is no support for the claim that the
cost-determinative approach limits litigation or that a totality of the
circumstances approach fosters litigation.
In claims arising under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, claims
wherein the predicate act is predatory pricing, many courts seem to
believe that a plaintiff is not entitled to a jury trial. Jury verdicts are
casually ignored as directed verdicts or judgments notwithstanding
the jury verdict are granted. This may be due in part to the self-
fulfilling prophecy adopted by many courts. Because some authorities
believe that predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried and rarely suc-
cessful, courts routinely find that the scheme at issue did not exist.
Unfortunately, courts are paying too much attention to cost-price
relationships and scholarly predictions and not enough attention to
other relevant factors indicative of predatory pricing. If this skepti-
cism and method of analysis continues, the courts will essentially be
sanctioning the very conduct that the antitrust laws were meant to
curtail.
MARTIN S. SIMKOVIC
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